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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the relation between nominal exchange rate volatility and several 
macroeconomic variables, namely real per output growth, excess credit, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the current account balance, in the Central and Eastern European EU 
Member States. Using panel estimations for the period between 1995 and 2008, we find 
that lower exchange rate volatility is associated with higher growth, higher stocks of FDI, 
higher current account deficits, and higher excess credit. The results are economically and 
statistically significant, and robust. 
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1. Introduction 
Monetary policy strategies in the Central and Eastern European EU Member States 
(hereafter CEE) differ considerably, from completely fixed exchange rate arrangements to 
pure floaters. At the beginning of the transition process, most of these countries relied on 
pegging the exchange rate to a highly stable currency, such as the US dollar or the 
Deutsche Mark, as a way to (i) achieve macroeconomic stabilization by means of a rapid 
disinflation process (“hard-pegs” as an external nominal anchor), and (ii) to facilitate the 
transition process from centrally planned to market economies, in the absence of fully 
developed markets and institutions (“hard-pegs” as an institutional device). However, by 
the beginning of this century, once macroeconomic stability was broadly achieved, a 
number of CEE countries gradually softened their pegs and moved towards more monetary 
policy autonomy; countries that did so adopted inflation targeting as a monetary policy 
framework. “Hard-pegs” made a significant contribution to restoring market confidence 
during the early period of transition.   
More recently, the particular policy challenges facing the CEE countries that operate 
“hard-pegs” have come to the forefront. Following the strong increase in the internal and 
external imbalances in the Baltic States and Bulgaria in the period up until 2008 they are 
now experiencing a very rapid economic adjustment period with deep recessions. Latvia 
even had to take recourse to an international financial support package led by the IMF in 
late 2008.   
From a theoretical point of view, there is not a clear consensus on the best 
exchange rate regime for macroeconomic performance. Proponents of fixed exchange rate 
regimes argue that exchange rate stability promotes economic performance through higher 
trade and enhanced macroeconomic stability which could favour foreign investment and 
growth, while impacting on investment and saving decisions (therefore affecting current 
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account) and financial development. In contrast, proponents of flexible exchange rate 
regimes traditionally emphasize the advantage of exchange rate flexibility to correct for 
domestic and external disequilibria in the face of real asymmetric shocks. 
This paper analyzes the relation between exchange rate volatility and several 
macroeconomic variables, namely real output growth, excess credit, the stock of inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and the current account balance, in the CEE countries. 
Using panel estimations for the period between 1995 and 2008, we find that lower 
exchange rate volatility is associated with higher growth, higher stocks of FDI, higher 
current account deficits, and, in general, higher excess credit. The results are economically 
and statistically significant, and robust. 
 The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some stylized facts 
regarding the exchange rate strategies and macroeconomic performance for the CEE 
countries. Section 3 discusses the theoretical arguments for the relation between exchange 
rate volatility and the selected macroeconomic variables, and tests these relations in the 
CEE countries. Section 4 summarizes the main findings. 
 
2. Exchange rate regimes and real convergence in the CEE countries – stylized facts 
Exchange rate strategies in the CEE differ considerably, from fixed exchange rate to 
pure floaters. At the beginning of the transition process, most CEE countries relied on 
pegging the exchange rate to a highly stable currency, such as the US dollar or the 
Deutsche Mark, as a way to import credibility from abroad and to reduce inflation from 
high levels. In the course of the 1990s, however, a number of countries gradually softened 
their peg and moved towards more monetary policy autonomy, and several countries 
adopted inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework (Table 1). In what follows, 
countries are subdivided into those with “hard-peg” regimes (i.e. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia 
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and Lithuania) and those with inflation targeting regimes combined with flexible exchange 
rates or relatively “soft-pegs” (“floaters”), i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia.1 
 Looking first at real GDP growth, while both groups show a clear upward trend 
until the ‘crisis year’ 2008, the “hard-peg” countries performed better than the “floaters” in 
most years (Figure 1). However, while the gap in growth rates between the two groups 
slightly increased to around three percentage points up to 2006, it virtually closed again at 
the end of our sample period (i.e. in 2008).  
A similar pattern emerges with regard to total domestic credit-to-GDP growth 
(Figure 2). Especially after the Russian crisis and up to 2006, annual credit-to-GDP growth 
accelerated in both sets of countries, particularly in the “hard-pegs”. In fact, during 1999-
2006 annual credit growth increased, on average, from around 14% in 1998 to more than 
33% in 2006 in the “hard-pegs”, and from around 17% in 1998 to around 21% in 2006 in 
the “floaters”. Having said that, credit growth has stabilized in recent years in the 
“floaters” and has decelerated significantly in the “hard peg” countries. 
As regards the ability to attract FDI, both sets of countries, with no particular 
difference, were able to build-up significant stocks of inward FDI over the overall period 
(Figure 3-4). For FDI inflows, however, a small deceleration is observed for 2007-2008 in 
both sets of countries, notably the “hard-pegs”. 
 A sharply different pattern emerges as regards the current account balance. Looking 
at Figure 5, the “hard-pegs” show much more sizeable external imbalances during most 
years. Current account imbalances consistently widened in the “hard-peg” countries, 
                                                          
1 Most CEE countries, particularly the “floaters”, have revised their exchange rate regime on several 
occasions over the period under study. This, however, does not change the classification of the countries 
under study between the two groups over the period 1995-2008. The only exception is Bulgaria, which 
introduced a currency board to the Deutsche Mark (euro since 1999) only on 1 July 1997. Slovakia adopted 
the euro as of 1 January 2009. 
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especially from 2004 to 2006, until 2007 before narrowing in 2008 against the background 
of decelerating GDP growth and imports. By contrast, external imbalances remained rather 
constant in the “floaters”.  
In sum, when looking at these stylized facts over the period 1995-2008, the main 
differences between the two groups are that “hard-pegs” experienced faster real GDP and 
credit growth and significantly higher external imbalances than “floaters”. Following the 
global financial crisis “hard-pegs” also seem to have experienced a more severe 
adjustment process than the “floaters”.  
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1 Sample selection and volatility measures 
 
In order to estimate the relation between exchange rate regimes and key economic 
indicators, an important decision to be made is the underlying definition of exchange rate 
volatility. While exchange rate arrangements are often divided into “hard pegs” and 
“floaters” (as in Section 2 of this paper), there is a broad variety of “intermediate” 
regimes.2 De jure exchange rate classifications, such as that of the IMF, depend on the 
countries’ ex ante self-assessment of their exchange rate regime. However, such 
classifications may well fail to control for a possible discrepancy between de jure and de 
facto regimes. Such a discrepancy has often arisen from the so-called “fear of floating”, 
leading countries to pursue exchange rate stabilization even when they declare their 
exchange rate regime to be flexible (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; McKinnon and 
                                                          
2 The official (IMF) classification of exchange rate arrangements, as published in the IMF Annual Report on 
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, provides a measure for the commitment by the 
monetary authorities to an specified exchange rate regime. The IMF classifies de jure exchange rate 
arrangements into eight groups with a rising degree of exchange rate flexibility: 1) exchange rate regime with 
no separate legal tender; 2) currency board arrangements; 3) other conventional fixed peg arrangements (with 
a band of at most ±1%); 4) pegged exchange rate arrangements with horizontal bands (at least ±1%); 5) 
crawling pegs (with small, preannounced adjustment); 6) exchange rates with crawling bands; 7) managed 
floating with no preannounced path for exchange rate; 8) independent floating (market-determined exchange 
rate and independent monetary policy). 
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Schnabl, 2004; De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2005). In this respect, de facto measures for 
exchange rate volatility provide more accurate information to assess the relation between 
exchange rate volatility and key macroeconomic variables. 
The measure of de facto exchange rate volatility against the euro that we use in our 
empirical analysis is the z-scores measure proposed by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003). It 
incorporates both exchange rate fluctuations around a constant level and exchange rate 
fluctuations around a gradual depreciation/appreciation rate: 
22
tttz σµ +=                                                             (1) 
where tµ  corresponds to the arithmetic average of month-to-month changes in the 
nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro in year t, in percentage, and tσ  is the standard 
deviation of the month-to month changes, of the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro 
of the year t, in percentage.3 
In the remainder of this section we explore the relation between exchange rate 
volatility and a number of key macroeconomic indicators, namely real per capita output 
growth, excess credit, the stock of inward FDI, and the current account balance. We use 
the fixed effect estimator in order to control for heterogeneity among countries and time 
periods, and the “sandwich” estimator for the variance and covariance matrix to control for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the error components. For each of the 
macroeconomic variables under investigation, we use those control variables that the 
literature has generally found to be significant in explaining the behavior of the respective 
dependent variable under investigation. We also test for endogeneity of exchange rate 
volatility and the other controls that enter in the regressions, and when there is evidence of 
                                                          
3 The z-scores measure in our example is highly and positively correlated to the standard deviation of the 
exchange rate ( tσ ). Thus, the use of z-scores − which includes a combination of standard deviation and 
changes of the exchange rate level − or tσ , as an alternative volatility measure, is quite indifferent. 
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endogeneity we use IV estimations by instrumenting the endogenous variables with their 
past lags.4   
Our sample consists of nine CEE countries: the “hard-pegs” Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania, and the “floaters” Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. The data sources are IMF International Financial Statistics, EUROSTAT, and 
UNCTAD. Since the dataset for the cross-country panel is very fragmented until 1994, our 
analysis period starts in 1995 and ends in 2008. This sample period excludes most of the 
macroeconomic turbulences that characterized the early transformation years, and for 
which data are not available. 
 
3.2 Output Growth and Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility  
This section investigates the effects of exchange rate volatility on the CEE 
countries’ growth performance. Traditionally, the literature provides little guidance on this 
subject. Some empirical literature stipulates the absence of a robust relation between 
exchange rate volatility (stability) and economic performance (Baxter and Stockman, 
1989; Gosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2003). In contrast, other authors underline that this relation 
exists, at least for some groups of countries (Husain, Mody and Rogoff, 2005), but their 
opinions differ about the way in which exchange rate volatility affects economic growth.  
Proponents of fixed exchange rate regime argue that nominal exchange rate 
stability promotes growth through trade (Rose, 2000; Frankel and Rose, 2002) and 
macroeconomic stability. Their main argument is that fixed exchange rates reduce 
uncertainty. A decline in exchange rate uncertainty also enhances price transparency 
increasing the efficiency of price mechanisms at international level (De Grauwe, 2005; 
Schnabl, 2007). Lower transaction costs and greater prices transparency also affect growth 
                                                          
4 The number of lags has been chosen to equal one. The Stock-Staiger test for valid instruments has been 
carried and all instruments appeared to be “strong”. 
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performance by increasing capital markets efficiency in capital allocation (McKinnon, 
1973) and by lowering risk premia and real interest rates (Dornbush, 2001). In addition, if 
there are credit constraints, or if investment is irreversible, lower aggregate nominal 
exchange rate volatility is likely to translate into higher growth.5  
Proponents of flexible exchange rate regimes traditionally emphasize the advantage 
of exchange rate flexibility in the face of real asymmetric shocks (Mundell, 1961, Fischer, 
2001). So, when a country is hit by real asymmetric shocks, and prices and wages adjust 
slowly, flexible exchange rates can adjust relative international prices to compensate for 
output losses (Mundell, 1961). Another argument in favour of greater exchange rate 
flexibility is the difference in adjustment to symmetric shocks. Indeed, when a country’s 
response to a common shock differs from that of its trading partners, more independent 
monetary and exchange rate policies can be needed to support the smooth adjustment of 
output and/or inflation (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993).  
The global financial crisis has renewed the debate about the appropriateness of 
exchange rate regimes in some CEE countries. Traditionally, the countries with higher 
exchange rate flexibility are reported to perform better during financial crises (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999; Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000), a finding that also holds for 
emerging and transition economies (Cerra, Panizza and Saxena, 2009). In contrast, Furceri 
and Zdzienicka (2009) show that higher exchange rate volatility is associated with higher 
output loss in the CEE countries. 
                                                          
5 For example, in models that assume investment irreversibility, Bernanke (1983), Pindyck (1991), Pindyck 
and Solimano (1993) and Price (1995, 1996) show that uncertainty and volatility can lead to lower 
investments, and thus to lower economic growth. Jovanovic (2006) shows pre-commitment to a risky 
technology determines a negative relation between volatility and growth. More recently, Blackburn and 
Varvarigos (2005) find that credit constraints and market imperfections can exacerbate uncertainty, leading 
to lower and more pro-cyclical investments, and thereby to lower growth. 
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Overall, the impact of exchange rate volatility on growth performance appears to 
depend significantly on the time period and the sample taken under consideration 
(Eichengreen and Leblang, 2003).  
To assess, the impact of nominal exchange rate volatility on output growth, we 
estimate the following equation:                   (2) 
where is the real GDP growth for country i at time t. The vector X includes a set of 
control variables affecting growth: i) the ratio of investment to GDP; ii) the fiscal deficit, 
in per cent of GDP; iii) (the log of) openness; and iv) population growth. We also include 
v) a dummy for 1998 (Russian crisis) and vi) a dummy for 2008 (the current financial 
crisis). The choice of these variables is in line with other papers focusing on the effect of 
exchange rate volatility on economic growth.6 
We start estimating equation (1) by means of a standard country-fixed effects panel 
and a robust variance and covariance matrix (Sandwich Estimator). The results are 
reported in Table 2. Looking at the table it becomes clear that exchange rate volatility has 
a significant negative impact on growth performance in the CEE economies during the 
sample period. This effect is robust to the inclusion of different control variables and of 
time fixed effects.  
We tested for possible endogeneity using the Hausman test. The results7 confirmed 
the presence of possible endogeneity for investment and public deficit, but not for 
exchange rate volatility.8 To deal with the presence of endogeneity, we re-estimated 
equation 2 using the lag of investment and public deficit as instruments. Again, the effect 
of exchange rate volatility on growth was negative and statistically significant. 
                                                          
6 See, for example, De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005); Schnabl (2007). 
7 The full set of test is availble from the authors upon request. 
8 Also from a theoretical point of view it is difficult to argue that real growth can affect exchange rate 
volatility. 
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We also controlled for possible serial correlations and estimated equation (2) by 
FGLS to deal with the AR (1) structure of the error term. Even in this case, the results 
were robust. 
Finally, following Aghion et al. (2006) we also tested whether the effect of 
exchange rate volatility on growth in the CEE countries is interrelated with the level of 
financial development (Hussaim, Mody and Rogoff, 2005) by including the interaction 
term between exchange rate volatility and the stock of private credit. The results, however, 
rejected this hypothesis, which may be due to the relative similar degree of financial 
development among CEE countries. 
 
3.3 Credit Cycle and Exchange Rate Volatility  
The credit boom in the CEE countries during the last decade has attracted the 
attention of several researches which aimed to assess whether the increase of credit was 
excessive (above equilibrium) or a natural process compatible with the catching up process 
of these economies with the euro area (Cottarelli et al, 2005; Egert et al., 2006; Kiss et al, 
2006; Backé et al. 2006; Zdzienicka, 2009). The findings of this stream of literature tended 
to favour the hypothesis of excessive credit growth, at least in recent years and in some 
CEE countries. The aim of this section is to assess whether exchange rate volatility could 
have played a significant role in explaining ‘excess’ credit development. 
From a theoretical point of view, greater exchange rate stability may 
encourage credit growth by diminishing risk premia and interest rates. As a negative side 
effect it also increases the possibility that lending growth accelerates to a level no longer 
justified by fundamentals, thus creating an 'excessive’ credit development. 
To test for the hypothesis that exchange rate volatility affects excess credit, we 
follow a two-step approach. First, we estimate the equilibrium level of credit (as a ratio to 
 GDP) and compute the deviation of credit from its long term equilibrium. Second, we 
estimate “excess” credit on exchange rate volatility and other controls variables.
Following a common approach in the literature the credit equilibrium level is 
estimated using the out-of –sample approach
credit determinants (GDP per capita and real interest rate
Western European countries
(Cottarelli et al., 2005, Schadler et al, 2005, 
Zdzienicka, 2009). In detail, to estimate the long
mean group (PMG) estimator on the panel of 12 Western European countries over the 
period 1980-2008. This estimator allows the intercept, short
variances to differ from country to country, but the long
to be the same across the group. To determine, the long
use the constant term of the “benchmark” countries (Maeso
In the second step we estimate 
volatility and other controls variables:        
where the dependent variable is 
term equilibrium. The parameter 
and credit deviation. The vector 
deviation of credit from its long
of the) openness, iv) population growth, v) monetary freedom index and vi) dummies for 
the announcement of the EU
capture credit expansion that corresponds to its cyclical component at the beginning of a 
                                                          
9 Other variables such as inflation, interest rate spread and public credit were also tested. However, the best 
specification includes only GDP per capita and interest rate.
10 All the results are availble from the authors upon req
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, in which the implied elasticities of long
9) are estimated for the 
, which represent the natural benchmark for the CEEs 
Egert et al., 2006; Kiss et al., 2006; 
-term equilibrium, we apply the pooled 
-term coefficients and errors 
-term coefficients are constrained 
-term credit equilibrium we also 
-Fernández et al, 2006)
“excess” credit as a function of exchange rate 
 
        
the credit deviation for country i at time 
 captures the relation between exchange rate volatility 
X includes a set of control variables that may affect the 
-run equilibrium: i) GDP growth, ii) inflation, iii) (the log 
 enlargement in 1998 and 2000. The first two variables 
 
uest. 
 
 
-run 
12 
 10. 
 (3) 
t from its long-
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cyclical upturn when firms need investment funds (Aghion et al, 1999; IMF, 2004). 
Openness and population growth capture structural variables (which do not enter in the 
specification of log term equilibrium). Monetary freedom and dummies for EU 
enlargement represent transition-related credit determinants (Arcalean et al, 2005).  
We estimate equation (2) using a standard panel country-fixed effect and robust 
variance and covariance matrix (Sandwich Estimator)11. The results, included in Table 3, 
report a negative and statistically significant impact of exchange rate volatility on credit 
deviation to its long-term equilibrium12. The results are extremely robust to the inclusion 
of different combination of controls and the inclusion of time fixed effects. Thus, our 
results confirm our hypothesis and suggest that in countries with less volatile nominal 
exchange rates the credit-to-GDP ratio can increase above its long-term equilibrium.  
 
3.4 FDI and exchange rate volatility  
Foreign direct investments have increased strongly in hard-peg and soft peg 
countries over the last decade. To understand this phenomenon the literature has generally 
focused on factors such as cost and qualification of labour force, long-term market 
potential, proximity to natural resources and developed markets business, institutional and 
legal environment, the degree of financial liberalization. 
In contrast the relation between exchange rate volatility and FDI has been mostly 
ignored13. From a theoretical point of view, one could expect that countries with less 
volatile exchange rates should be more attractive to foreign investors. At the same time, if 
                                                          
11 We also run endogeneity tests, but neither exchange rate volatility nor the control variables turn out to be 
endogenous to excess credit. 
12Additionally, we find a positive and generally significant impact of inflation (which can be explained by 
the fact that high inflation increases uncertainty and thus reduces credit demand, Cottarelli et al. , 2005), 
monetary freedom (financial and monetary liberalization are positively associated to credit, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999) and the dummy for economic integration (credit can overshoot due to “eu-phoria”). 
13 Few works inlcude Ricci, (1998); Ito and Kroeger, (2000); Bénassy-Quéré et al., (2001). 
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foreign investors are not risk-adverse and expect to obtain extra profit exchange rate 
uncertainty (Darby et al., 1999), exchange rate volatility may have positive impact on FDI.  
To test whether exchange rate volatility has a positive or negative effect on FDI we 
estimate the following equation:  
itititiit EXXFDI εβδα +++=ln                                            (4) 
The dependent variable is the (log of the) stock of inward FDI in county i at time t. 
The vector X includes a set of control variables which are found in the literature to be 
robust determinants of FDI14 i) (the log of) the level of real GDP; ii) (the log of) the level 
of real GDP per capita; iii) (the log of) openness, defined as the GDP’s share of exports 
plus imports; iv) openness; v) unit labor costs and vii) dummies for the announcement of 
EU enlargement in 1998 (“first-wave”) and 2000 (“second-wave”).  
 We estimate equation (5) using country-fixed effects and a robust variance and 
covariance matrix (Sandwich Estimator). The results reported in Table 4 suggest a 
negative effect of exchange rate volatility on FDI stock. The result is robust across several 
specifications and the inclusion of time fixed effect. We also test for non-linearity. In fact, 
it could well be the case that the negative relation between exchange rate volatility and 
FDI is even more negative for more open economies. For this purpose, we add to our 
baseline equation the interaction between exchange rate volatility and openness 
(Interaction). Indeed, the results confirm this hypothesis. The endogeneity between FDI 
and the independent variables has been tested. The tests confirm the presence of 
endogeneity with respect to GDP per capita and GDP growth. However, when we re-
estimate the equation using as instrument the lags of the endogenous variables, the effect 
of exchange rate volatility is still negative and significant. 
                                                          
14 See, for example, Lansbury et al. (1996), Altomonte (1998), Holland and Pain (1998), Resmini (2000), 
Woodward et al. (2000), Cartensen and Toubal (2003),Clausing and Dorobantu (2005). 
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Finally, we replicate our estimates using FDI flows (instead of stock) as dependent 
variables. The results reported in Table 5 still confirm a negative and significant relation 
between exchange rate volatility and FDI. 
 
3.5 Current Account and exchange rate volatility 
The widening current account imbalances that have emerged in most CEE 
countries before the current international financial crisis have attracted considerable 
attention (see Ca’Zorzi et al., 2009 for a survey). The reason for such development can be 
found in the size of domestic absorption, in particular a low savings-investment ratio, large 
capital inflows into the region attracted by investment opportunities and strong economic 
performance, and large imports of capital good and intermediate factors.  
From a theoretical point of view, a country that runs a substantial current account 
deficit should generate a trade balance surplus through an increase in competitiveness by 
real exchange rate depreciation (Roubini and Watchel, 1998, Chinn and Wei, 2008).15 
Based on this, the fact that CEE countries with more flexible exchange rate show 
experienced smaller current account disequilibria is a priori justified. At the same time, the 
sign of the impact of exchange rate volatility depends on the impact of exchange rate 
volatility on saving and investment. As argued before, higher exchange rate volatility may 
decrease investment (especially foreign ones) due to higher risk premia and interest rate. 
On the other side, exchange rate volatility has an impact of consumption and saving 
decisions because it amplifies or reduces macroeconomic volatility and consumption 
smoothing. Thus, the impact of exchange rate volatility on the current account balance is 
not certain a priori and depends on the sign and the magnitude of the effect of exchange 
rate volatility on saving and investment.  
                                                          
15 The risk of real appreciation is even more important in transition economies where the catchin-up process 
results in higher inflation (Balassa-Samuelson effect, administrative prices and taxes adjustment; Schadler et 
al., 2005). 
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Also from an empirical point of view there is a lack of consensus on the effect of 
exchange rate volatility on current account imbalances. While some authors have found a 
positive and robust relation between current account adjustment and exchange rate 
flexibility (Rahman, 2008; Herrman, 2009; Gosh et al. 2009),  other studies have found the 
absence of any significant relation (Chinn and Wei, 2008; Slavov, 2009).  
In order to test for a significant relation between exchange rate volatility and the 
current account balance, we estimate the following equation: 
   itititiit EXXY
CA
εβδα +++=                                             (5) 
where the dependent variable is the ratio of the current account balance to GDP for 
country i at time t. The vector X includes a set of control variables affecting saving and 
investment. In particular, following the literature on the determinants of current account 
balance16, we include the following variables: i) relative income (to the EU15); ii) relative 
income squared; iii) GDP growth ); iii)  FDI inflow;  iv) Inflation; v) credit-to-GDP 
(financial deepening); vi) public deficit; vii) Openness viii) and capital controls.  
The estimates of equation (5) are reported in Table 6. The results suggest a positive 
and statistically significant relation between exchange rate volatility and current account 
balance. The results are extremely robust to different inclusion of controls, time fixed 
effects and the AR(1) structure of the error term. Given the (tested) endogeneity of GDP 
growth, FDI and the public deficit to the current account, we also estimated the relation 
using IV, instrumenting these variables with their lags. The results confirm the significant 
relation between nominal exchange rate volatility and the current account balance.    
                                                          
16 See, for example,Chinn and Prasad (2003); Chinn and Ito (2007, 2008), Gruber and Kamin (2007, 2009) 
for a detailed discussiion of the detemriants of current account imbalances. 
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In all, the results suggest that countries with higher exchange rate volatility have 
more balanced current accounts, which reflects the impact of exchange rate volatility on 
saving and investment. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Exchange rate strategies in the CEE countries differ considerably, from fixed 
exchange rate regimes to pure floaters. At the beginning of the transition process, most 
CEE countries relied on pegging the exchange rate to a highly stable currency, such as the 
US dollar or the Deutsche Mark, as a way to import credibility from abroad and reduce 
inflation. In the course of the 1990s, a number of countries gradually softened their peg 
and moved towards more monetary policy autonomy and several countries adopted 
inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework. 
When we look at stylized facts regarding the macroeconomic performance of the 
“hard peg” and “floating” CEE country groups over the period 1995-2008, the evidence is 
quite mixed. While “hard-pegs” tended to experience faster real GDP and credit growth 
than “floaters”, they also tended to experience relatively larger external imbalances and a 
more significant adjustment process since the beginning of the current international 
financial crisis.  
Moving beyond stylized facts, the empirical results of our paper suggest that 
differences in exchange rate volatility across the CEE countries during the 1995-2008 
period are, indeed, associated with differences in key macroeconomic variables. More 
specifically, our findings suggest that, over this period as a whole, lower nominal 
exchange rate volatility was associated with higher growth, higher stocks of FDI, higher 
current account deficits, and higher excess credit. 
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Figure 1. Real GDP Growth (in %) 
 
Source: Eurostat. Shaded area corresponds to maximum and minimum values, Lines to un-weighted average. 
 
 
Figure 2. Credit-to-GDP Growth (in %) 
 
Source: Eurostat. Shaded area corresponds to maximum and minimum values, Lines to un-weighted average. 
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Figure 3. FDI Inflow (Real terms, log of Millions of $) 
Source: UNCTADD. Shaded area corresponds to maximum and minimum values, Lines to un-weighted 
average 
 
Figure 4. FDI Stock Inward (Real terms, log of Millions of $) 
  
Source: UNCTADD. Shaded area corresponds to maximum and minimum values, Lines to un-weighted 
average. 
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Figure 5. Current account balance (% of GDP) 
  
Source: Eurostat. Shaded area corresponds to maximum and minimum values, Lines to un-weighted average 
Table 1. Official monetary policy strategies of CEE countries up to 2008 
 
HARD PEG
-25
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-15
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0
5
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
FLOATERS
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Monetary policy strategy Currency Features
Bulgaria Exchange rate target Bulgarian lev Exchange rate target: peg to the euro at 1.95583 lev per 
euro within the framework of a currency board 
arrangement. 
Czech Republic Inflation target Czech koruna Target: 3% ±1 percentage point until end- 2009; thereafter 
2% ±1 percentage point.  Managed floating exchange rate.
Estonia Exchange rate target Estonian kroon Participates in ERM II with a ±15% fluctuation band 
around central rate of EEK 15.6466 per euro. Estonia 
continues with its currency board arrangement as a 
unilateral commitment. 
Latvia Exchange rate target Latvian lats Participates in ERM II with a ±15% fluctuation band 
around central rate of LVL 0.702804 per euro. Latvia 
continues with a fluctuation band of ±1% as a unilateral 
commitment.
Lithuania Exchange rate target Lithuanian litas Participates in ERM II with a ±15% fluctuation band 
around central rate of LTL 3.45280 per euro. Lithuania 
continues with its currency board arrangement as a 
unilateral commitment.
Hungary Inflation target Hungarian forint Inflation target: 3% (±1 p.p.) medium term target since 
2007.
Poland Inflation target Polish zloty Inflation target: 2.5%, with  ±1 percentage point (12-
month increase in the CPI). Free floating exchange rate.
Romania Inflation target Romanian leu Inflation target: 4%, 3.8% and 3.5%, with ±1 percentage 
point for end-2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively. Managed 
floating exchange rate.
Slovakia Inflation targeting in the conditions of 
ERM II
Slovak koruna Participates in ERM II with a ±15% fluctuation band 
around central rate of Slovak koruna 30.1260 per euro. 
The inflation target is set below 2% at end-2007 and at end-
2008. 
Sources: ESCB.
Official monetary policy strategies of Central and Eastern European EU Member States
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Table 1: Output Growth and Exchange Rate Volatility 
 
OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE+ 
time FE 
2SLS#  
AR(1) 
Zscore 
-0.001 
(-4.40)*** 
-0.001 
(-4.88)*** 
-0.001 
(-3.22)*** 
-0.001 
(-6.21)*** 
-0.001 
(-6.30)*** 
-0.001 
(-7.27)*** 
-0.001 
(-7.98)*** 
-0.001 
(-7.49)*** 
0.001 
(-4.48)*** 
-0.001 
(-4.24)***
Investment 
0.495 
(0.93)  
0.160 
(2.92)*** 
0.078 
(1.50) 
0.132 
(2.11)** 
0.214 
(3.00)*** 
0.197 
(3.28)*** 
0.204 
(3.41)*** 
-0.077 
(-1.16) 
-0.014 
(0.88) 
Deficit 
0.005 
(5.17)*** 
0.006 
(5.30)***  
0.006 
(4.56)*** 
0.006 
(6.28)*** 
0.006 
(4.86)*** 
0.005 
(4.53)*** 
0.004 
(4.17)*** 
0.007 
(2.85)*** 
0.005 
(3.49)*** 
Openness 
0.064 
(4.50)*** 
0.068 
(3.87)*** 
0.079 
(3.97)***  
0.056 
(3.58)*** 
0.061 
(3.80)*** 
0.758 
(4.31)*** 
0.041 
(1.63)* 
0.060 
(3.94)*** 
0.087 
(3.92)*** 
Population 
growth 
0.020 
(2.07)** 
0.023 
(2.10)** 
0.029 
(2.52)** 
0.226 
(2.11)**   
0.027 
(2.98)*** 
0.022 
(2.63)*** 
0.026 
(2.54)** 
0.014 
(0.88) 
Dummy_1998  
-0.009 
(-1.01) 
-0.149 
(-0.98) 
-0.018 
(-1.81)* 
-0.014 
(-1.47) 
-0.016 
(-1.78)* 
-0.013 
(-1.51) 
-0.025 
(-2.34)** 
-0.003 
(-0.47) 
 
Dummy_2008  
-0.011 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.015 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.110 
(-1.81)* 
-0.016 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.013 
(-2.59)** 
-0.013 
(-3.12)*** 
-0.011 
(-1.00) 
-0.007 
(-2.16)** 
 
Credit      
-0.000 
(-2.33)**    
 
Interaction       
-0.000 
(-0.89)    
 
           
Observations 115 117 115 115 123 123 115 115 114 106 
R2 0.69 0.70 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.75 0.80 0.69 0.40## 
           
Robust standard errors; t-statistics in parentheses 
*,**,*** respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%; # Instrumented variables: Investment, Deficit, ##R2 within,  
 
 
 
 
 
   Table 2: Credit Deviations and Exchange Rate Volatility 
 
OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE+ 
time FE 
Zscore 
-6.334 
(-2.57)** 
-6.228 
(-3.03)*** 
-0.404 
(-1.78)* 
-6.559 
(-
3.06)*** 
-6.191 
(-3.01)*** 
-3.142 
(-1.71)* 
-5.055 
(-2.83)*** 
GDPgrowth 
-75.013 
(-0.91)  
-89.321 
(-1.09) 
 
31.611 
(0.41) 
-25.217 
(-0.37) 
-17.465 
(-0.23) 
-109.926 
(-1.24) 
Inflation 
0.950 
(2.43)*** 
0.947 
(2.87)***  
1.007 
(2.94)*** 
0.936 
(2.85)*** 
0.429 
(1.48) 
0.726 
(2.54)** 
 
Openness 
16.000 
(1.07) 
-5.441 
(-0.39) 
12.030 
(0.85) 
-9.399 
(-0.63)  
17.013 
(1.17) 
-60.179 
(-2.84)*** 
Population 
growth 
26.981 
(2.15)** 
19.491 
(1.85)* 
23.865 
(2.04)**  
20.391 
(1.95)* 
34.016 
(3.38)*** 
11.372 
(1.36) 
Monetary 
Freedom 
0.516 
(4.00)*** 
0.530 
(3.93)*** 
0.199 
(1.66)* 
0.672 
(5.13)*** 
0.517 
(4.20)***  
0.421 
(2.57)** 
Dummy_1998  
-0.120 
(-0.02) 
-3.391 
 (-0.63) 
-0.570 
(-0.10) 
0.058 
(0.01) 
-2.605 
(-0.42)  
Dummy_2000  
25.892 
(3.76)*** 
24.892 
(3.03)*** 
27.720 
(3.84)*** 
25.304 
(3.81)*** 
25.259 
(3.11)***  
        
Observations 109 109 115 109 109 111 109 
R2 0.48 0.58 0.50 0.55 0.58 0.52 0.72 
        
 
  Robust standard errors; t-statistics in parentheses 
   *,**,*** respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%;  
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Table 3: FDI stock and Exchange Rate Volatility 
 
OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS 
+FE+ 
time FE 
2SLS# 
Zscore -0.005 (-3.29)*** 
-0.005 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.005 
(-2.44)*** 
-0.006 
(-2.97)*** 
-0.005 
(-3.51)*** 
-0.005 
(-3.34)***
-0.006 
(-3.90)*** 
-0.006 
(-2.92)* 
-0.007 
(-1.79)* 
GDP -0.301 (-0.83) 
 
 
-0.711 
(-1.90)** 
0.500 
(13.81)*** 
-0.020 
(-0.05) 
-0.516 
(-1.96)* 
-0.466 
(-1.42) 
0.466 
(1.28) 
-0.011 
(-0.03) 
 
GDP_capita 0.014 (3.15)*** 
0.015 
(4.02)***  
0.018 
(4.54)*** 
0.026 
(6.34)*** 
0.018 
(9.92)*** 
0.018 
(9.82)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.79)***
0.018 
(8.56)*** 
 
Openness 0.746 (4.48)** 
0.477 
(11.86)*** 
1.202 
(3.33)***  
0.460 
(1.27) 
0.934 
(3.17)*** 
0.885 
(2.79)*** 
-0.211 
(-0.60) 
0.490 
(1.26) 
Interaction      0.000 (-2.14)**    
Financial 
Freedom 
0.168 
(4.48)*** 
0.016 
(4.54)*** 
0.023 
(7.09)*** 
0.016 
(4.42°***  
0.014 
(4.06)*** 
0.015 
(4.58)*** 
0.012 
(3.73)*** 
0.015 
(5.30)*** 
Labor Unit 
Cost 
0.005 
(0.81) 
0.003 
(0.63) 
0.019 
(6.78)*** 
0.002 
(0.28) 
-0.004 
(-0.61)   
-0.003 
(-0.64)  
Dummy_1998 -0.027 (-0.41)      
0.004 
(0.05) 
0.751 
(3.99)***  
Dummy_2000 0.038 (0.57)      
0.011 
(0.15) 
1.130 
(6.18)***  
          
Observations 101 101 101 101 103 112 112 101 105 
R2 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 
          
Robust standard errors; t-statistics in parentheses 
*,**,*** respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%; # Instruments:?,  
 
 
 
 
                Table 4: FDI flows and Exchange Rate Volatility 
 OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE OLS +FE 
Zscore 
-0.008 
(-2.12)** 
-0.008 
(-2.06)** 
-0.007 
(-2.07)** 
-0.008 
(-2.19)** 
-0.008 
(-2.24)** 
-0.006 
(-1.88)* 
GDP 
0.336 
(0.54)  
-0.027 
(-0.04) 
 
0.698 
(7.44)*** 
0.509 
(0.79) 
 
0.191 
(0.31) 
GDP_capita 
0.010 
(3.46)*** 
0.009 
(3.39)***  
0.010 
(3.87)*** 
0.0112 
(4.61)*** 
0.010 
(3.57)** 
Openness 
0.331 
(0.56) 
0.624 
(6.20)*** 
0.873 
(1.53)***  
0.174 
(0.29) 
0.469 
(-2.62) 
Interaction      
0.000 
(-2.62)*** 
Financial 
Freedom 
0.010 
(0.60) 
0.010 
(0.61) 
0.032 
(2.16)** 
0.010 
(0.60)  
0.010 
(0.63) 
Dummy_1998 
0.301 
(1.54) 
0.030 
(1.58) 
0.193 
(1.05) 
0.303 
(1.52) 
0.320 
(1.58) 
0.307 
(1.59) 
Dummy_2000 
0.033 
(0.26) 
0.023 
(0.17) 
-0.061 
(-0.44) 
0.048 
(0.37) 
0.047 
(0.38) 
0.007 
(0.05) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 120 122 120 
R2 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.83 
       
               Robust standard errors; t-statistics in parentheses 
                *,**,*** respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%;  
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Table 5: Current Account and Exchange Rate Volatility  
 OLS 
+FE 
OLS 
+FE 
OLS 
+FE 
OLS 
+FE 
OLS 
+FE 
OLS 
+FE 
OLS+FE OLS +FE OLS 
+FE+ 
time FE 
2SLS# AR(1) 
Zscore 
0.542 
(3.08)*** 
0.430 
(2.50)** 
0.423 
(2.82)*** 
0.630 
(3.46)*** 
0.495 
(3.36)*** 
0.431 
(2.43)** 
0.471 
(2.63)*** 
0.506 
(3.49)*** 
0.532 
(2.69)*** 
0.549 
(2.79)*** 
0.300 
(1.76)* 
Relative_income 
3.264 
(4.04)***  
2.986 
(3.78)*** 
3.679 
(4.37)*** 
3.253 
(4.06)*** 
3.466 
(3.67)*** 
2.736 
(3.47)*** 
3.207 
(4.47)*** 
3.012 
(318)*** 
3.890 
(4.85)*** 
2.776 
(2.34)** 
Relative_income-
squard 
-12.805 
(-4.10)***  
-11.656 
(-3.83)*** 
-14.616 
(-4.54)***
-12.766 
(-4.11)*** 
-14.090 
(-3.83)***
-10.781 
(-3.53)*** 
-12.581 
(-4.51)*** 
-12.090 
(-3.34)*** 
-15.136 
(-4.78)***
-11.358 
(-1.54) 
Growth 
-12.634 
(-2.01)* 
-8.661 
(-1.30)  
-11.067 
(-1.67)* 
-13.712 
(-2.78)*** 
-17.490 
(-2.61)***
-13.824 
(-2.17)** 
-12.326 
(-1.88)* 
-7.594 
(-0.95) 
-12.554 
(-2.22)** 
-8.360 
(-1.54) 
FDI_inflows 
-1.294 
(-2.22)** 
-1.737 
(-3.35)***
-1.165 
(-1.99)**  
-1.337 
(-2.28)** 
 
-1.096 
(-1.68)* 
-1.416 
(-2.44)** 
-1.324 
(-2.64)*** 
-1.310 
(-2.06)** 
-1.380 
(-2.64)*** 
-0.466 
(-0.90) 
Inflation 
-0.006 
(-0.37) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
 
-0.026 
(-2.39)** 
-0.016 
(-0.89)  
0.013 
(0.83) 
0.003 
(0.20) 
-0.004 
(-0.28) 
 
-0.016 
(-0.81) 
-0.008 
(-0.45)  
Credit_GDP 
-0.015 
(-3.52)*** 
-0.100 
(-5.06)***
-0.106 
(-3.66)*** 
-0.089 
(-3.69)***
-0.093 
(-3.65)***  
-0.090 
(-3.30)*** 
-0.095 
(-3.48)*** 
-0.084 
(-2.84)*** 
 
-0.107 
(-4.43)** 
 
-0.054 
(-173)* 
Deficit_GDP 
0.050 
(0.25) 
-0.074 
(-0.36) 
-0.052 
(-0.25) 
0.024 
(0.12) 
0.028 
(0.15) 
0.061 
(0.29) 
0.023 
(0.20)  
0.124 
(0.54) 
0.042 
(0.22)  
Openness 
-0.498 
(-0.16) 
1.908 
(0.62) 
-0.758 
(-0.25) 
-3.269 
(-1.18) 
-0.347 
(-0.11) 
1.461 
(0.42) 
1.238 
(0.41  
-5.454 
(-1.39) 
-1.565 
(-0.56) 
 
 
Capital Control  
-0.091 
(-2.69)*** 
-0.039 
(-1.05) 
-0.099 
(-2.92)*** 
-0.010 
(-3.07)***
 
-0.088 
(-2.66)*** 
-0073 
(-1.83)*  
-0.090 
(-2.95)*** 
-0.104 
(-2.54)*** 
-0.101 
(-2.49)**  
            
Observations 113 113 113 114 113 113 113 113 113 112 104 
R2 0.74 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.69 0.41## 
            
F-country fe            
            
Robust standard errors; t-statistics in parentheses 
*,**,*** respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%; # Instruments: Exchange rate volatility, ##R2 within,  
 
 
